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 THE RECESSION, 
BUDGETS, 
COMPETITION, AND 
REGULATION: SHOULD 
THE STATE SUPPLY 
BESPOKE PROTECTION? 
Paul K. Gorecki∗ 
 
 Recessions are harsh. Demand declines. Firms shed labour, reduce output 
or file for bankruptcy. Pressure mounts to reduce prices and increase 
productivity. Returns decline; margins are squeezed; dividends are 
suspended. Unemployment increases. Firms seek to delay payments to 
suppliers, while simultaneously demanding suppliers reduce input prices and 
extend credit. Carefully assembled workforce teams are broken up.  New 
products and innovations are put on hold. Competition is characterised as 
cut-throat, destructive and excessive. Faith in markets begins to be 
questioned.    
1. 
Introduction 
 
As a result some producers, often with the support of organised labour, 
demand protection or shelter from market forces in a recession. The 
demand for what will be referred to as bespoke protection takes many forms 
from legislative to budgetary. The state is asked to provide free insurance 
against the impact of the recession, usually to well organised and articulate 
groups. Of course, the state already provides protection against the effects 
of the recession through universal programmes: for individuals, 
unemployment benefits, medical cards and, in exceptional cases, mortgage 
 
∗ This paper has benefited from comments and suggestions made by ESRI colleagues at a 
lunchtime seminar on 27 May 2009. I should like to thank Seán Lyons, Noreen Mackey and 
Fran O’Toole for commenting and discussing an earlier version of the paper as well as two 
anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions. The paper reflects events as of 26 August 
2009. The usual disclaimer applies.  
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assistance; and, for firms, bankruptcy and limited liability laws. This paper 
focuses on bespoke protection, rather than universal programmes. 
 
A superficially plausible case can be made for responding to these 
demands by providing bespoke protection. Unprecedented times demand, it 
is argued, radical solutions. Government, many believe, should preserve jobs 
to the maximum extent possible. The banking crisis and light touch 
regulation demonstrates liberal capitalism has failed. There is a need to tame 
the market. Too much competition, or what has been referred to as 
‘overcompetition,’ leads to destructive and cut-throat competition driving 
firms, employees and their families into penury. The intervention need only 
be temporary. Thus, there will be no long-term adverse impact on growth 
and productivity. This paper considers the validity of such arguments. 
 
There are three inter-related issues that need to be addressed by the state 
in considering the demand for bespoke protection: 
 
• On what criteria or grounds should the state supply such free 
insurance to particular groups in recessionary times? In other words, 
why should the state intervene? 
 
• How and in what form should the state provide the protection? The 
state has a number of instruments that it can use to supply the 
protection demanded, from budgetary to regulatory; and 
 
• What are the consequences of providing bespoke protection, in 
terms, for example, of productivity and growth? What can be learnt 
from previous examples of protection provided in similar 
circumstances? Will bespoke protection impede the rapid recovery 
scenario from the current recession as set out in Bergin et al. (2009, 
Figure 2, p. 11)?  
 
In answering these three questions two alternative approaches are used: 
public choice and welfare economics. Public choice is about explaining the 
actions of public representatives based on the assumption that politicians 
make choices that they think will get them re-elected. In contrast, welfare 
economics focuses on the overall welfare of society. It is more about what 
politicians should do and about working out the consequences of sub-optimal 
decisions by politicians.  
 
The paper is divided into five sections including the Introduction. Section 
2 considers the alternative instruments that governments can employ to 
provide bespoke protection and the merits, from a public choice perspective, 
in a tight budgetary situation of favouring off-budget instruments such as 
regulation and competition. Section 3 presents some actual or proposed 
recent examples of the provision of bespoke protection – restrictive 
regulatory and competition interventions. In each case a public choice and 
welfare economics approach is considered. Attention turns in Section 4 to 
the costs and benefits of providing bespoke protection, drawing both on the 
Irish and international experience. A bleak picture emerges of the economic 
costs of acceding to the demand for bespoke protection, while some of the 
benefits are transitory. Section 5 compares the answers to the three 
questions set out above using the public choice and welfare economics 
frameworks. The answers are not the same. The public choice model results 
in granting bespoke protection which is not justified using welfare 
economics criteria. This suggests that welfare can be improved if 
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mechanisms can be put in place that result in political decisions closer to 
those favoured by welfare economics. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
2. 
Some 
Preliminary 
Observations: 
Instrument 
and Public 
Choice 
The purpose of this section is to provide a thumbnail sketch of how the 
public choice mechanism can influence government intervention. Attention 
is also devoted to how the predictions derived from public choice with 
respect to instrument choice are reinforced by the current recession. A 
particular Irish twist that solves two of the problems inherent in public 
choice is discussed next. The section concludes with a brief discussion of 
whether or not welfare economics and public choice are likely to respond to 
demands for bespoke protection in a similar manner.   
INSTRUMENT CHOICE 
Governments can intervene to supply relief from market forces. 
Governments have a rich menu of instruments of intervention from which 
to choose. These can be divided into three broad categories:1 
 
• Budgetary, such as subsidies (e.g. overpayment for goods and 
services, award contracts on non-competitive basis, modernisation 
and R&D grants and so on) and tax expenditures (e.g. tax relief for 
investing in selected activities such as multi-storey car parks and 
holiday camps); 
 
• Regulatory, such as restricting entry by placing a cap on the number  
of participants in a regulated activity and/or mandating price 
reductions in a regulated activity; and 
 
• Competition, such as partial or complete exemption of certain 
markets or professions or other groups from competition law 
and/or budget reductions/reorganisations of the competition agency 
that lessen operational effectiveness.  
 
These instruments are substitutes in many policy contexts in that each 
can be used to achieve the same policy objective.  
 
An example illustrates the point. After the decline in the value of sterling 
at the end of 2008 due to the UK recession, Irish shoppers increasingly 
turned to Northern Ireland for their groceries.2 Retailers in Ireland 
eventually reacted by reducing some prices, evidenced by Tesco’s 
announcement on 5 May 2009 (Tesco, 2009). This in turn put pressure on 
food processor margins and farm gate prices. Demands for bespoke 
protection from the impact of these pressures could be met in various ways:  
 
 
1 There are, of course, other instruments that the state could employ. For example, 
Trebilcock et al. (1982) consider public inquiries and public enterprise, but do not consider 
competition policy. In part this reflects the different contexts within which choice of 
instrument is considered. In this paper the context is the recession, while for Trebilcock et 
al. (1982) the context was part of a larger study of regulation.  
2 For further discussion of these developments see Revenue Commissioners/Central 
Statistics Office (2009). 
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• Budgetary assistance through a tax on food which would be 
redistributed to food processors and farmers, and/or grants to 
enhance productivity of processors and farmers and/or provision of 
an export credit scheme with a state-backed guarantee;3 
 
• Regulatory assistance through the creation of a Retail Ombudsman 
to make sure that processors and farmers are paid sufficiently to 
ensure “equity and fairness in the food supply chain” and/or 
government instructions to the independent regulator, the 
Commission for Energy Regulation (CER), to reduce electricity 
prices,4 and, 
 
• Competition assistance through the exemption of food processors 
and farmers in dealing with retailers from the Competition Act 2002 
(the Competition Act), so that producers can combine to offset the 
alleged buyer power of the supermarkets. 
 
Of course, it is possible that these instruments can be used in a 
complementary manner, with one reinforcing the other. 
 
If the state is to intervene to provide bespoke protection, the issue arises 
of what form the intervention might take. In other words, which of the three 
instruments are likely to be selected? In an era of budgetary restraint in 
Ireland consequent on the worldwide recession, exacerbated considerably by 
domestic policy failures, there are severe constraints on the extent to which 
these demands for protection can be met through increased budgetary 
measures.5 Instead the relative attractiveness of the two off-budget balance 
sheet instruments identified above – regulation and competition policy – is 
likely to increase. These off-budget instruments have minimal public 
expenditure implications, while delivering the desired benefits to the group 
demanding protection. Vigorous competition policy and independent 
regulation designed to promote entry and competition for the benefit of 
consumers thus may be seen as unaffordable luxuries in a period of 
economic crisis, if the state decides to supply protection demanded by 
particular groups. 
 
It should be noted that budgetary measures may be used to complement 
restrictive regulation and competition policies in times of recession if they 
involve a reduction, rather than an increase, in public expenditure. For 
example, the effectiveness of regulatory and competition agencies can be 
weakened through budgetary reductions and/or reorganisations. This 
weakening will lead to less vigorous enforcement of competition law, with 
the result that private arrangements to mitigate the impact of the recession, 
 
3 Apart from the tax on food, this response was favoured by food processors. For details 
see FDII (2009a; 2009b). In this connection it might be noted that the government 
announced in 2006 a €50 million investment grant package to beef and sheepmeat 
processors. For details see Department of Agriculture and Food (2006).  
4 The Retail Ombudsman is favoured by the farmers (IFA, 2009a) and FDII (2009a; 2009b), 
while the FDII also called for lower electricity prices in meeting the challenge posed by 
Tesco’s price cuts. The quotation in the text is from IFA (2009a). 
5 For details of the budgetary situation see Barrett et al. (2009). The General Government 
Deficit is forecast to be 12 per cent of GDP in 2009, 11.5 per cent in 2010. While public net 
current expenditure will decline in nominal terms, in volume terms it will remain essentially 
constant over this period. 
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such as a cartel, are less likely to be detected and prosecuted. This, therefore, 
facilitates private, albeit illegal, market restrictions.6   
PUBLIC CHOICE 
Public choice is about explaining choices made by politicians.7 A number of 
different assumptions have been made as to what politicians are maximising, 
what they are trying to achieve, what motivates and guides their selection of 
policies or other actions as public representatives. Trebilcock et al. (1982, 
p.11), for example, assume that proximate aim of politicians is …maximizing 
the likelihood of their election or re-election. In this respect politicians are 
competing for the marginal voters, since these voters are most likely to 
switch compared to infra-marginal voters. Friedman (1990, p. 546), in 
contrast, assumes that the …politician is seeking to maximize his long-run income 
(plus non pecuniary benefits, one of which maybe ‘national welfare’)… subject only to 
the constraint that they need to get re-elected.  
 
Public choice theory sees politicians as operating in a market in which 
they supply (say) bespoke protection during a recession, in return for actions 
which contribute positively towards their aim or objective such as re-
election. These actions might, for example, include campaign and other 
contributions to party coffers. Certain propositions have been developed 
using this framework which can assist in predicting the conditions under 
which politicians supply bespoke protection and the likely characteristics of 
the instrument selected. 
 
A number of propositions have been developed in the public choice 
literature, which are particularly relevant in respect of instrument choice. 
Two are considered here, following the terminology adopted in Friedman 
(1990, pp. 545-548): 8 
 
• protection will favour concentrated not dispersed groups; and 
 
• politicians will prefer transfers for which the information cost of 
determining what is going on is as high as possible for the victims – 
 
6 There is some evidence that cartels are more likely to occur in a recession. For example, 
Stephan (2009) finds, contrary to expectations, that many of the cartel infringements in the 
past 10 years …indicate that many collusive agreements may be formed as a consequence of an economic 
downturn. (p. 5). In Ireland the formation of a beef cartel was encouraged by the government 
in order to reduce overcapacity. The Competition Authority took a case under the 
Competition Act. Although the Competition Authority lost at the High Court, the case was 
appealed and aspects of the case were referred to the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) by 
the Supreme Court. The ECJ ruled that the beef capacity reduction arrangements were an 
infringement of competition law. The Supreme Court has still to decide whether despite 
being an illegal agreement there are offsetting advantages, which would mean that on 
balance the arrangements were consistent with competition law. The Supreme Court held 
the hearing on 25-26 May 2009. Judgment is awaited.  
7 It is, of course, the case that the discussion could be extended, as the literature shows, to 
include other important actors such as public servants. However, it could be argued in a 
country such as Ireland with a much smaller public sector – in absolute size – and thus a 
smaller span of control within a government department, compared to many other larger 
countries, that politicians are able to exert an unusually high degree of influence over 
decisions and hence it is appropriate to concentrate attention on politicians in this paper. 
See Trebilcock et al. (1982) for consideration of other actors besides politicians. 
8 A third is that more efficient transfers will be preferred to less efficient transfers. For a 
discussion see Friedman (1990). 
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consumers and taxpayers – and as low as possible for the 
beneficiaries – small well organised groups. 
 
The prediction that protection will typically be awarded to small 
concentrated groups rather than larger dispersed groups reflects a number of 
factors. First, there is a greater incentive to belong to a concentrated group 
than a dispersed group. This reflects the differing pay-offs or benefits. Let us 
assume that the bespoke protection is equivalent to €20 million that benefits 
20 firms €1 million each per year, while the cost is borne by consumers 
through a small increase in price, equivalent €10 per household per year. The 
firm has a much greater incentive to belong to a group since the pay-off is 
substantial whereas for the household the cost is trivial. Second, there is an 
information problem. Members of a concentrated group are much more 
likely to be aware of the value of the benefit afforded by the protection and 
have an incentive – given its expected size – to estimate its magnitude. In 
contrast, a dispersed group is much less likely to be aware of the cost to 
them of the restriction and may not be in a position to estimate its 
magnitude. Furthermore, even if they were, given that the likely magnitude is 
small they may decide to remain what Friedman (1990, p. 547) and others 
call “rationally ignorant.”9  
 
Third, it is easier to overcome the free-rider problem for a concentrated 
than a dispersed group. Each group – whether it is the concentrated or 
dispersed – is providing a benefit that takes on the characteristics of a public 
good.10 In other words, if the concentrated group is successful in securing 
protection (or the dispersed group successful in preventing the protection), 
then a firm (or member of the dispersed group) is likely to benefit 
irrespective of whether or not it contributed to funding, organising and 
participating in the group. Hence, if the firm (or member of a dispersed 
group) does not contribute to the group it still benefits and thus is referred 
to as a free rider. If there are too many free riders the group will not be 
formed, since insufficient subscriptions will be collected to fund the 
lobbying effort. Overcoming the free rider problem is much easier for the 
concentrated group since moral persuasion and social sanctions can be 
applied, which are much more difficult to apply to a dispersed group. There 
is, of course, the added problem of identifying members of the group, which 
is likely to be more difficult for the dispersed group. Thus, it is easier to free 
ride in the dispersed than the concentrated group. Fourth, the transaction 
costs of running a concentrated group are much more likely to be small 
compared to a dispersed group, especially given the above factors.  
 
The second prediction is that politicians will prefer transfers for which 
the information cost of figuring out what is going on is as high as possible 
for the victims – consumers and taxpayers – and as low as possible for the 
beneficiaries – small well organised groups. This point is fairly obvious. 
Politicians have no desire for consumers and taxpayers to become aware that 
each of them is paying a small increase in price in order that income can be 
 
9 See Peltzman (1989, p.6). 
10 These are a very special class of goods which cannot practically be withheld from one 
individual consumer without withholding them from all (the non excludability criterion) and for 
which the marginal cost of an additional person consuming them, once they have been 
produced, is zero (the non rivalrous consumption criterion). Paul M. Johnson, “A Glossary of 
Political Economy Terms,” http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/public_goods. 
(Accessed on 15 May 2009).  
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transferred to a concentrated group, particularly if that group is perceived to 
be well off and in some sense privileged. Hence, the provision of bespoke 
regulation is likely to be justified on grounds other than a transfer or quasi 
tax on a large group to benefit a small group. In the example cited above 
concerning assistance to food processors and farmers the bespoke regulation 
could be justified, for example, on grounds of ensuring equity and fairness in 
the food chain.11 
 
It might, of course, be argued in some sense that the various special 
interest groups would cancel each other out. In other words, there would be 
some sort of balance that would neutralise the impact of these special 
interest groups.12 However, there can be no assurance that this will occur in 
the context of this paper, in examining whether or not bespoke protection 
should be offered in a recession. Indeed, it is unlikely to be the case. It is 
often the case that these special interest groups combine to argue for 
protection, rather than oppose one another.13 
 
There are a number of criticisms that could be made of the public choice 
explanation of when bespoke protection will be provided.14 These criticisms 
are not so much that the discussion above is incorrect, but rather that it 
needs to be extended. It is not clear, from a public choice perspective, when 
the state will say ‘yes’ and when it will say ‘no’ to demands for bespoke 
protection.15 There appear to be no bright lines that can be used to exclude 
demands from certain groups or activities, but not others. Equally, there are 
 
11 On 11 August 2009, the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment issued a 
consultation document on proposals to establish an Ombudsman to enforce a code of 
practice for grocery good undertakings (Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, 
2009). The consultation document referred to …the need to achieve balance in the relationships 
between grocery undertakings, taking into account the need for a fair return to both suppliers and retailers, 
the need to enhance consumer welfare…(p. 2). The proposals were welcomed by food processors 
(IBEC, 2009c) and farmers (IFA, 2009b), while retailers have, as yet, to take a position. In 
their initial reaction retailers talked about the necessity of ensuring, …that no obstacles are put 
in the way of retailers securing the best value from their suppliers and, in turn, delivering the most competitive 
price to consumers (IBEC, 2009b).  
12 There are instances where the interests of differing groups might to some extent offset 
each other. For example, in international trade negotiations there may be groups opposed to 
further liberalisation such as farmers and other groups such as exporters that are in favour 
of greater liberalisation and openness.  
13 A good example is the Voluntary Restraint Agreements (“VRAs”) that between 1981 and 
1985 artificially restrained the volume of car exports from Japan to the US. These were in 
reaction to the file jointly submitted by the Ford Motor Company and the United Auto 
Workers to the US International Trade Commission for relief from imports. Although it 
was unsuccessful it led to the VRAs. It has been estimated that in 1984-1985 the VRAs 
imposed the equivalent of an 11 per cent tariff on cars, with a benefit to producers of $2.6 
billion, about a quarter of industry profits, but of course, there was also a positive impact on 
employment and wages. For details see Hufbauer (1991, pp. 121-125). 
14 There are, of course, more fundamental criticisms of the public choice approach. 
Trebilcock (2005, pp. 436-438), for example, points out how the move towards deregulation 
and vigorous competition policy are examples of policies that by and large benefit dispersed 
rather than concentrated groups. However, in Ireland these policies have not been followed 
with the same degree of vigour as in other countries. Attempts to reform the regulation in 
urban buses was a failure, while several of the examples of deregulation in Ireland – taxis 
and pharmacies – have come about because of judicial intervention, rather than public 
policy. Furthermore, as reported below, recent policy action by the state appears to signal a 
downgrading of competition policy.   
15 Becker (1983) presents a model where interest groups compete for rents that tries to 
resolve this issue. 
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many well informed groups demanding bespoke protection. Hence, while 
there may be information asymmetries between the concentrated group that 
receives such protection and the dispersed group that pays the cost, such 
asymmetries may not obtain with other concentrated groups, particularly in 
adjacent areas of economic activity. This poses a problem for the politician 
in that in giving bespoke protection to one concentrated group but not 
another it may alienate the latter group. In the discussion of social 
partnership below one possible method of resolving this is presented.   
IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTRUMENT CHOICE 
The second prediction has an implication for instrument choice. Restrictive 
regulation and relaxing competition policy are much more opaque methods 
of providing bespoke regulation than budgetary measures such as a tax 
increase. In the example cited earlier concerning the impact of price 
reductions on food processors and farmers, the government could impose a 
tax on groceries and then redistribute the revenue to the processors and 
farmers or it could set up a Retail Ombudsman to make sure that processors 
and farmers are paid sufficient to ensure “equity and fairness in the food 
supply chain.” Both instruments of intervention have the same outcome in 
terms of redistributing income to farmers and processors, but in the latter 
case the transfer is cloaked in language designed to justify higher consumer 
prices that may well be acceptable, while a tax on food would probably result 
in howls of outrage, especially given that poor consumers spend a 
disproportionate percentage of their income on food. Perhaps it is for this 
reason that an ombudsman has recently been proposed by government.16 
AN IRISH TWIST: SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP17 
While these predictions are general, in the case of Ireland, a specific 
institutional structure, social partnership, has been put in place that is 
conducive to facilitating the introduction of bespoke protection. Although 
partnership is primarily concerned with pay bargaining, since its inception in 
1987 its remit has gradually been extended so that now it …is difficult to think 
of a policy issue that is not now the subject of some social partnership working group or 
another… (Hardiman, 2006, p. 362). Social partnership is a corporatist 
arrangement whereby, primarily, representatives of organised labour and 
business, together with the government taking the role of chairman, reach 
multi-year agreements on important aspects of economic and social policy. 
For example, the partnership framework for 2006 to 2015 is 140 pages in 
length – not including a separate 11 page document on agriculture – and 
covers everything from the Irish abroad to better regulation.18  
 
Partnership is essentially an interest or pressure group model of decision 
making. As noted above, it is typically the well organised groups 
representing labour and business which do a deal, with the blessing of 
 
16 See footnote 11 above for details. 
17 For a further discussion of partnership see for example, Boyle et al. (2004), Hardiman 
(2000, 2006), Roche (2009) and references cited below. 
18 For details see Department of the Taoiseach (2006). At the present time there are 
ongoing discussions to reach a new a partnership agreement between the social partners in 
view of the changed economic circumstances. It appears that reaching an agreement is 
proving challenging. 
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government.19 There are no groups representing consumers. The advantages 
of any partnership agreement reached, even if it contains bespoke 
protection, is likely to be stressed by the parties to the agreement. It is very 
difficult for the outsider to unpick the deal, as the negotiating process and 
the various trade-offs reached are conducted in secret, with very little 
involvement of the legislature.  
 
Social partnership helps resolve the co-ordination problems identified 
above with respect to the public choice approach as to when bespoke 
protection will be provided. The partnership process involves many if not all 
of the concentrated groups that are likely to demand bespoke protection. It 
thus provides a forum in which these groups can reach an accommodation 
as to which demands should be met.    
 
This is not to deny that there may be benefits flowing from social 
partnership (Hardiman, 2000; 2006). The process may lead, for example, to a 
shared understanding of the problems facing the Irish economy and thus 
make resolution easier to formulate and implement. However, these benefits 
should not be exaggerated. For example, the OECD (2001, p. 26), based on 
Fitz Gerald (1999), questions whether partnership led to an outcome for 
wages that was any different from what market forces would have led to. As 
Fitz Gerald (1999, p. 162) states, While helping to bring about a more orderly labour 
market, with fewer industrial disputes than in the 1970s, the partnership approach served 
more to validate the results which market forces had made inevitable.   
 
In view of subsequent developments in social partnership this conclusion 
arguably needs to be modified, perhaps even rejected. In particular, public 
sector pay rises awarded in 2003 and thereafter were based on a comparison 
of equivalent positions in the private sector (Kelly et al., 2009, p. 342). The outcome 
of this benchmarking process was that the public sector pay differential with 
the private sector …increased from less than 10 per cent in 2003 to almost 22 per 
cent in 2006, controlling for human capital and other relevant pay determining 
characteristics… (Kelly et al., 2009, p. 364).20 In other words, it does not appear 
that there were any objective economic grounds for the increase in public 
sector pay compared to the private sector.21,22 Such significant widening of 
the public/private sector pay differential is likely to have adverse macro-
economic effects: competitiveness will suffer due to wage inflation in the 
private sector, the tax burden is increased and any downward adjustment in 
public sector wages in the current recession is likely to be difficult, raising 
the possibility of strikes and other forms of industrial action.  
 
19 While it is true that a third pillar, the community and voluntary sector, was added in 1997 
(Hardiman, 2000, p. 293), …the core economic actors – unions and employers – inevitably have a 
privileged status over the community and voluntary sector (Hardiman, 2006, p. 348). 
20 This is likely to understate the differential since no account is taken of the fact that public 
servants have defined benefit, rather than defined contribution, pension schemes, that there 
is greater pension coverage in the public sector and there is much greater job security in the 
public compared to the private sector.  Kelly et al (2009, p. 365) estimate that the impact of 
the greater pension coverage in the public sector is to raise the pay differentail in 2003 from 
9.7 per cent to 12.9 per cent.  
21 The result is consistent with the hypothesis put forward by Boyle et al. (2004, p. 22) that 
partnership conferred greater bargaining power than they [public sector unions] would otherwise have had. 
22 The basis on which the increased differential was recommended was not made public and 
appears inconsistent with other evidence such as that on vacancies. For further details see 
O’Leary (2002). 
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ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, INSTRUMENT CHOICE AND 
INTERVENTION 
The rationale for intervention and the instrument selected using the public 
choice approach is unlikely to coincide with that provided by welfare 
economics, as illustrated in Table 1. Typically in the welfare economics 
approach the first question to be asked is: What is the rationale for 
intervention? In terms of the grounds for intervention, the relevant question 
is whether or not there is a market failure that merits intervention. The 
market failure might be a misallocation of resources due to the existence of a 
monopoly, the presence of negative externalities due to environmental 
pollution and so on. Given that there is a sound rationale for intervention, 
the next question is: What is the most appropriate instrument?  The 
instrument selected is designed to be the most cost effective, with a 
preference for transparent instruments that increase accountability. There 
can be no guarantee that it will be off-budget rather than budgetary. 
Furthermore, before deciding whether to actually intervene there is a need to 
compare the cost of intervention with the benefits. The third set of issues is 
the economic and other consequences of intervention guided by welfare 
economics and public choice considerations. A priori it seems likely that 
interventions guided by welfare economics will improve the welfare of 
society whereas it is not at all clear that this will hold for interventions based 
on public choice. In the next two sections this latter issue will be discussed 
in more detail.  
Table 1: Public Choice and Welfare Economics Models: Answers to Three 
Questions  
  
Public Choice Model Welfare Economics Model 
 
Q1 Why? Political benefits> political 
costs 
 
Q2 Which instrument? 
Regulation/competition; not budgetary 
 
Q3 Consequences? 
Concentrated groups will benefit at the 
expense of widely dispersed groups 
 
 
Q1 Why? Market failure 
 
 
Q2 Which instrument? Preference for 
more transparent 
 
Q3 Consequences? 
Increase in societal welfare 
 
Source: See text. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
3.  
Demand and 
Supply of 
Bespoke 
Protection: 
Some Recent 
Illustrative 
Examples 
There are already signs that the recession has resulted in increased demands 
for bespoke protection. In some cases the protection has been granted, in 
others the outcome is not yet certain as events unfold on a daily basis. The 
purpose of this section is to provide illustrative examples of the way in 
which regulation and competition may be used to provide bespoke 
protection in the current economic climate. In each case reference is made 
to whether or not from a welfare economics point of view there is a market 
failure that  merits bespoke  protection. The list is not exhaustive; it is meant  
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to be illustrative only.23  
REGULATION 
There are a number of ways in which regulation can provide protection to 
those adversely affected by the recession. As noted above these ways include 
restrictive regulation and influencing regulatory decisions.   
Restrictive Regulation: 24 Proposed Cap on Taxi Licences 
Prior to 2000 entry into the taxi market had been restricted dating back to 
1978.25 Taxi licences acquired a substantial value.26 Liberalisation occurred in 
2000 as a result of a High Court ruling which found that the Minister of 
Transport could not impose limits on the number of taxi licences.27 The 
number of taxi licences more than tripled between 2000 and 2004 
(Goodbody, 2009, Table 4.3, p. 32). In the latter year a Taxi Regulator was 
established which presaged reforms such as a national fare structure and 
other changes. The number of taxi licences continued to climb, so that by 
2008 the level was 50 per cent above 2004 and five times the level in 2000. 
Demand also increased. In Dublin, for example, there were 22 million trips 
in 1997, 27 million just after liberalisation and in 2008, 40 million 
(Goodbody, 2009, Figure 3.3, p. 18). Waiting times were reduced drastically: 
in Dublin, for example, 58.3  per cent of taxi users waited 10 minutes or less 
in 1997, by 2008 the corresponding percentage was 85.7 per cent 
(Goodbody, 2009, Table 6.3, p. 49).  
 
In more recent times the gross earnings of taxi drivers has fallen – by 5 
per cent between 2005 and 2008 in Dublin (Goodbody, 2009, p. 43) – and 
hours of work increased – by 8 per cent between 2005 and 2008 in Dublin 
(Goodbody, 2009, Table 5.8, p. 45). There are indications that as national 
unemployment grows and overall economic activity declines that the 
number of new taxi licences issued is declining, while the exit rate has 
increased.28 Furthermore, it appears that there is some discounting of taxi 
fares, since the Taxi Regulator only sets maximum fares.29 Terenure Taxis, 
which operates in south Dublin, for example, offers a 10 per cent discount 
off metered fares.30 In other words, there is nothing unusual in the way in 
which the taxi market is functioning that might merit government 
intervention.  
 
23 It could, of course, be argued that the selection may be biased in that the most successful 
examples of bespoke protection will pass with little comment in the media. However, the 
author was a member of the Competition Authority between 2000 and 2008 and so would 
have been aware of attempts to supply bespoke protection through competition and 
regulation, since in both cases the Competition Authority would have been involved either 
directly or indirectly in making comments and presentations. 
24 Other examples include the Retail Ombudsman mentioned earlier in the paper. 
25 For details see Barrett (2006). 
26 See Table 2 below for details. 
27 Humphrey v. Minister for Environment and Local Government [2000] IEHC 149; [2001] 
1 ILRM 241 (13 October, 2000). The judgment may be accessed at:  
http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2000/149.html. Accessed on 19 May 2009. 
28 Goodbody (2009, Table 9.1, p. 78; Figure 9.1, p. 78).  
29 Goodbody (2009, p. 77).  
30 Based on an advertisement by Terenure Taxis in the free sheet Town & Village June 2009 
issue on the front page. The free sheet is distributed to various places in south Dublin and 
claims a circulation of 20,000. 
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Under these conditions it is not surprising that taxi owners have 
organised to seek protection from the impact of the recession that has 
exacerbated a decline in income, a lengthening of the working week and 
pressure on prices. These demands continue despite the March 2009 report 
by Goodbody for the Taxi Regulator. The report rejected the call for a 
moratorium on the issuing of new licences, for which taxi organisations had 
called. Goodbody (2009, pp. 83-84) could identify no market failure which 
would justify such a policy move. Indeed, it pointed out the adverse effects 
on consumer welfare of such a moratorium. This has not stopped the 
clamour for government to provide bespoke protection to taxi owners.  
 
SIPTU, which represents a number of taxi drivers,31 for example, states: 
 
We totally reject the notion that people should be expected to work longer, 
harder and for less pay ad infinitum. 
 
There is also an important question for us of having an appeals system in 
place to protect our members’ rights, not to mention the health and safety 
implications of the Goodbody approach, for the travelling public and our 
members (SIPTU, 2009). 
 
Protests by taxi drivers have continued in support of these demands. 
Traffic is disrupted; consumers and others are inconvenienced. 
 
Some elected representatives have lent more than a sympathetic ear to 
the plight of the taxi owners. The Chairman of the Joint Oireachtas 
Committee on Transport, Frank Fahey, criticised the methodology in 
Goodbody by stating that:  
 
… it is like reading the front of The Beano. Mr Feeney [from Goodbody] 
has no idea about drivers’ incomes. The driver of any cab into which one gets 
will tell you that he or she is earning below the minimum wage. They cannot 
all be fooling us. I have been in five or six cabs in recent weeks, the drivers of 
which tell me that they earned €50 over eight or nine hours. The report’s 
finding is ludicrous and every cab driver in this city [Dublin] and throughout 
the country is hopping mad about it. (Joint Oireachtas Committee on 
Transport, 25 March 2009, p. 8).   
 
In the latter respect the Deputy preferred to rely on the information 
gleaned from taking five or six cabs as opposed to the representative sample 
included in Goodbody.  
 
The Labour Party wants to introduce not only a moratorium on new 
licences, which it argues is consistent with Deputy Fahey’s proposals in a 
new bill the Taxi Regulator Amendment Bill 2009, but also that before 
issuing new licences the regulator would be required to consider…taking 
capacity and the demand-supply balance into account… (Labour Party, 2009, p. 22). 
It is not clear why administrative intervention, rather than the market, is 
needed to make such decisions. Thus although the Minister has up until now 
 
31 The vast majority of drivers own and operate their cabs. …. Only a small minority of 
drivers are renting as opposed to owning a licenced vehicle. (Goodbody, 2009, p. 23). Thus 
SIPTU in this context is representing the self-employed rather than the employed. 
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rejected calls for a cap on the number of licences, the pressure continues for 
a moratorium on issuing new licences. 
 
There seem to be three different concerns expressed with the regulatory 
regime. First, there is a concern that standards are not appropriate and that 
there are insufficient resources to enforce the existing rules. The solution to 
these problems is setting the correct standards and ensuring that there are 
adequate resources so that they can be enforced. Second, there is a concern 
that taxi drivers’ earnings are in some sense too low. Restricting entry is the 
answer of the taxi organisations supported by some elected representatives. 
However, it is not clear what market failure would be addressed by a putting 
a cap on numbers. If the return is too low in this market then taxi drivers 
will exit and/or not enter in as large numbers. Indeed, as noted above this is 
the record of recent developments in the taxi market. Furthermore as 
Goodbody (2009, p. 84) points out there is no guarantee that a cap will raise 
incomes of existing taxi owners unless other restrictive rules are also 
introduced. Third, it is sometimes argued that it is necessary to restrict entry 
in order to ensure that proper standards are adhered to by the taxis. 
However, it is not at all clear why if enforcement of existing standards is 
adequate, that there is any linkage between the two. Indeed, in pharmacy 
where entry restrictions were introduced in 1996 in part on the grounds of 
improving quality, there is no evidence of any improvement, but pharmacy 
incomes increased substantially (Gorecki, 2009b). Finally, there is no 
evidence that when entry controls on the number of taxis were in place prior 
to 2000 that there were not problems with the quality of taxi services; on the 
contrary there was widespread dissatisfaction because of a shortage of taxis 
at certain times (Barrett, 2006, p. 4). 
Influencing Regulatory Decisions: Electricity Prices  
The Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) is an independent regulator 
of the energy sector, including electricity prices. It has processes and 
procedures concerning the conduct of its affairs and cycles for the review of 
key issues such as price and investment reviews. Adhering to those processes 
and procedures is important in terms of creating regulatory certainty and 
predictability. The greater the uncertainty and unpredictability the greater the 
regulatory risk, which translates into, for example, higher cost of capital with 
consequent adverse effects on price and investment for consumers. 
 
Ireland’s industrial electricity prices are high by EU standards. The 
National Competitiveness Council (NCC) regularly draws attention to this 
situation. (NCC, 2009, Figure 3.37, p. 65). IBEC (2009a) raised the question 
of high energy costs during the 2009 partnership talks, including at several 
meetings with the Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural 
Resources and the CER. It appears that in part as a result of these exchanges 
the Minister asked the CER to undertake a review of electricity prices to 
determine if prices could be reduced. More specifically the Minister stated: 
 
We have a robust regulatory energy framework in Ireland which is transparent 
and encourages competition. It is right that we maintain the role of the CER 
as the decision-maker in terms of pricing. To this end, I am asking the energy 
regulator to undertake an immediate review of options to bring forward a 
reduction in electricity prices. Based on current trends I expect a double-digit 
decrease in electricity and gas prices this year. (DCENR, 2009a, p. 1). 
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In response to the Minister’s request the CER issued a proposed decision 
paper (CER, 2009a) and subsequently issued the decision (CER, 2009b). The 
CER complied with the Minister’s request by: 
 
…re-profiling network charges, bringing forward reductions now and repaying 
them next year, there can be a reduction in the short term. The advantages of 
this approach are that it is non-distortionary and benefits all electricity users 
regardless of their supplier. (CER, 2009a, p. 21).  
 
 In other words, prices will be a little lower in the short term and a little 
higher in the medium term, compared to what they otherwise would be. 
 
The action of the Minister clearly undercuts the perceived independence 
of a major regulator and thus increases regulatory risk for a very short term 
gain. The CER (2009a, p. 4) drew attention to this in its proposed decision: 
[T]he re-profiling is not without risk, as it deviates from established regulatory process 
creating market uncertainty and introducing unpredictability into regulatory decisions. In 
the CER’s final decision, which summarised the various submissions 
received, several firms expressed concerns as to the impact of the re-
profiling on regulatory risk and predictability.32 
 
A number of observations can be made on the Minister’s actions. First, if 
the aim of policy is to reduce energy prices, then there are a number of 
regulatory alternatives that can be considered. Some of these, for example, 
envisage reform in market structure. One change which has attracted 
considerable support is that Eirgrid, the transmission system operator, 
should own the transmission network, rather than the former vertically 
integrated monopolist in the electricity market, ESB.33 However, the 
Minister decided to defer in March 2008 decision on this issue pending yet 
another report (DCENR, 2008). The promised senior independent chairman 
responsible for overseeing the process leading to the report was not 
appointed until 15 months later at the end of June 2009.34 Second, it is not 
clear that any analysis was carried out concerning the economic rationale for 
the Minister’s intervention. Is there a market failure? What are the benefits 
and costs of a small reduction today in prices compared to a slightly higher 
offsetting price later in 2009? Surely, if there are systematic problems with 
the regulatory regime they should be addressed directly rather than through 
ad hoc policy interventions. In other words, is it a sufficient rationale for 
 
32 For example, CER (2009b, p. 23) report that: ESB Networks raised their concern that 
the re-profiling option significantly distorts the whole framework of unbundling and price regulation 
that has been developed over the last decade. Further to this it introduces significant additional risk 
and is likely to increase the perceived Regulatory risk in Irish network infrastructure assets and 
consequentially increase the cost of capital. 
33 See, for example, Fitz Gerald et al. (2005), Competition Authority (2004a), OECD (2001), 
and Prasifka (2009). 
34 For details of the statement by the Minister see DCENR (2008) in which reference is 
made to appointing shortly a senior independent chair who in turn would …appoint 
independent consultants to carry out the technical and economic analysis. However, the Chair was not 
appointed until 29 June 2009. In the news release making the announcement, reference is 
made to an assessment of the costs and benefits and the regulatory impacts, for which input 
will be sought from …all the direct key stakeholders: ESB and EirGrid managements, ESB and 
EirGrid unions and ESB Employee Share Ownership Trust (DCENR, 2009b). No reference is 
made to consumers or other agencies such as the CER, the Competition Authority or 
others with a broader consumer/economic welfare perspective. 
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public intervention that one of the social partners is concerned enough that 
it raises the matter with the Minister?   
COMPETITION 
Competition policy has been strengthened considerably in terms of 
legislation and resources since 2000. The Competition Act 2002 (the 
Competition Act) modernised competition law in Ireland. Mergers were 
assigned to the Competition Authority and were to be assessed on a 
competition test, instead of a broad public interest test. Sanctions against 
criminal cartels were raised and the Competition Authority was given better 
and more effective investigative tools. The restrictive Groceries Order 1987, 
which criminalised reducing price below the invoice cost for certain grocery 
products, was abolished in 2006. The budget of the Competition Authority 
was raised substantially during the early part of the decade. However, with 
the onset of the recession the future for competition policy is not as 
favourable, as a number of measures have been proposed or implemented 
which have the effect either directly or indirectly of weakening competition 
law and enforcement in furtherance of the supply of bespoke protection.   
 
In terms of the administration of competition policy a decision was made 
in October 2008 to merge the Competition Authority with the National 
Consumer Agency (NCA).35 Ongoing discussions are taking place to 
implement this merger with legislation expected in late 2009/early 2010. 
Subsequently, it was announced on 18 June 2009 that the Consumer 
Directorate in the Financial Regulator will incorporated into the NCA.36 
Finally, the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure 
Programmes (2009), headed by Colm McCarthy, recommended in its July 
2009 report that the Irish Takeover Panel be merged with the Competition 
Authority.37 These organisational changes are likely, in the short run at least, 
to reduce enforcement efforts of competition law.38 
 
Two sets of activities have or are scheduled to be made partially exempt 
from the Competition Act: 
 
 
35 See Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (2008a; 2008b). For an analysis of 
the merger see Gorecki (2009a) which suggests little consideration was given to the 
problems and mechanics of the merger prior to the decision being made. 
36 See Department of Finance (2009). 
37 It is not clear on what basis this merger is being proposed. No cost savings are expected. 
It is not at all clear how the duties of the Irish Takeover Panel dovetail with the consumer 
and competition remit of the new Competition/NCA/Consumer Directorate in the 
Financial Regulator. A reading of Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure 
Programmes (2009, Volume 1, pp. 18-19; p. 27) does not fill this gap. 
38 This reflects: first, resources will have to be diverted from enforcement to address issues 
surrounding the merger of the Competition Authority and the NCA; second, there appear to 
be some differences in the way that the NCA and the Competition Authority view price 
fixing agreements. The two representative organisations of the publicans, the Vintners 
Federation of Ireland (“VFI”) and the Licensed Vintners Association (LVA), announced a 
price freeze on behalf of their over 5,500 members from 1 December 2008 (VFI/LVA, 
2008). The NCA broadly welcomed the announcement, but would have preferred that the 
emphasis was on reducing prices (Michael and Cullen, 2008). In contrast, the Competition 
Authority, which sees its role as promoting consumer welfare, saw the behaviour as a 
breach of competition law and successfully instituted legal proceedings against the two 
representative organisations, after unsuccessfully asking them to cease and desist 
(Competition Authority, 2009a; 2009b).  
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• trade associations representing medical professions in negotiating 
with the Minister for Health and Children are able under the 
Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest Act, 2009, to 
consult on the outcome of any such negotiation without 
contravening section 4 of the Competition Act;39 and,  
 
•  voice-over actors, freelance journalists and session musicians are to 
be made exempt from section 4 of the Competition Act when 
engaging in collective negotiations. 
 
In addition, under the Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Act 2008 
the application of merger control is removed from the Competition 
Authority and transferred to the Department of Finance for certain classes 
of credit institution mergers. It should be noted, however, that the state 
cannot exempt firms in Ireland from EU competition law. Thus trade 
associations will still be subject to Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, while if 
mergers reach the European Union merger control financial and other 
thresholds they will be subject to assessment by the European Commission, 
not the Member State.40 
Exemptions: Voice-over Actors, Freelance Journalists and Session 
Musicians41  
As a result of an Competition Authority investigation into possible price-
fixing between self-employed actors and advertising agencies for voice-over 
services, the union representing the actors, Irish Actors’ Equity SIPTU, and 
the trade association representing the advertising agencies, Institute of 
Advertising Practioners in Ireland, agreed in 2004 not to enter into or 
implement any agreement that fixes fees for voice-overs (Competition 
Authority, 2004b). Subsequently, Equity tried unsuccessfully to persuade the 
Competition Authority that the former impugned agreements between it and 
the advertising agencies benefited from the exemptions set out in section 
4(5) of the Competition Act and/or Article 81(3) of the Treaty.42 
 
Broadly speaking section 4(5) of the Competition Act sets up a series of 
criteria whereby an agreement that would otherwise damage consumer 
 
39 For further discussion on this exemption see Gorecki (2009a) and Competition (2009). 
There is some question as to whether or not this is an exemption. It could be argued that 
consultation is not prohibited under the Competition Act, based on Judge Findlay-
Geoghegan’s recent decision in the pharmacists case (Hickey and others vs HSE (2007) 180 
COM, and that all this amendment does is clarifies the position based on this judgment. It 
should be noted that in the past that some medical groups have employed boycotts to gain 
higher fees and/or preserve the status quo that resulted in the Competition Authority 
commencing proceedings under the Competition Act.   
40 It is, of course, the case that under certain conditions parts of a merger relevant to a 
particular Member State can be referred by the Commission to a Member State to assess. 
This occurred in 2008 when Heineken’s proposed acquisition of Beamish and Crawford was 
referred back to Ireland to be dealt with the under the relevant section of the Competition 
Act.   
41 This discussion draws heavily on Gorecki (2009a). 
42 The author was the member of the Competition Authority responsible for reviewing the 
arguments put forward by the representatives of voice-over actors and with other members 
of the Competition Authority deciding that, in its view, the section 4(5) criteria were not 
met. 
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welfare is permitted.43 These criteria, which include that the agreement 
promotes technical or economic progress, improves the production or 
distribution of goods, while allowing consumers a fair share of the benefits, 
are cumulative. Thus, the legislation strikes a balance whereby the damage 
caused by the price fixing is compared to the benefits and a judgment made. 
In other words, this is very much like a cost-benefit analysis that would be 
undertaken as part of the welfare economics approach used to award 
bespoke protection.  
 
However, despite the fact that the Competition Authority considered that 
the agreement did not pass the tests set out in section 4(5), part of the text 
of the partnership agreement of September 17, 2008 reads as follows:  
 
The Government is committed to introducing amending legislation in 2009 to 
exclude voice-over actors, freelance journalists and session musicians, being 
categories of workers formerly or currently covered by collective agreements, 
when engaged in collective bargaining, from the provisions of Section 4 of the 
Competition Act, 2002 taking into account, inter alia, that there would be 
negligible negative impacts on the economy or on the level of competition, and 
having regard to the specific attributes and nature of the work involved subject 
to consistency with EU competition rules. (Dobbins, 2008). 
 
It is well established that the Competition Act does apply to workers 
when they are self-employed, but not when they are employees. While 
agreements among voice-over actors etc. as to price may have only a 
negligible impact on the economy, it is nevertheless likely to raise prices in 
the affected markets. Indeed, in a recent recruiting drive, trade unions 
claimed that they raise the price of labour.44 
Trading Places: Credit Crisis, Banks, Takeovers, and Mergers45 
Since 1 January 2003, under the Competition Act, the Competition 
Authority has had responsibility for merger control in Ireland. All mergers 
above a certain turnover threshold have to be notified to the Competition 
Authority. This requires a thorough investigation to see whether the merger 
leads to a substantial lessening of competition (SLC) and if it does whether 
there are any remedies that might fix the competitive problems created by 
the merger. The Competition Authority is a specialist body with expertise in 
applying the SLC test to several hundred mergers since 2003.  
 
This changed in 2008 with respect to banking where under certain 
conditions the Department of Finance administers the SLC test. To 
maintain the stability of the financial system guarantee arrangements to 
safeguard all deposits with respect to six Irish banks was introduced 
effective on midnight on September 29 2008 for two years. Coverage was 
subsequently extended to five banking subsidiaries with significant 
 
43 For further discussion see Whish (2009, pp. 148-164). Section 4(5) provides a legal 
exception to the prohibition in section 4(1) concerning agreements that prevent, restrict or 
distort competition, by, for example, price fixing, sharing/allocating markets and/or limiting 
production, by providing that it may be declared that section 4(1) is inapplicable if certain 
conditions – specified in section 4(5) – are satisfied.  
44 See http://www.ictu.ie/joinaunion/. 
45 This discussion draws heavily on Gorecki (2009a). 
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operations in Ireland.46 However, the emergency legislation also amends the 
Competition Act to give the Minister for Finance control of merger review 
involving financial institutions. 
 
For such mergers, if the Minister for Finance considers that the proposed 
one is necessary to maintain the stability of the financial system, then the 
Minister may approve the merger even if it will result in SLC. Under the 
legislation, the responsibility for determining whether the merger will lead to 
an SLC lies with the Minister for Finance, not the Competition Authority. 
Furthermore, although the Minister for Finance may as he/she sees fit 
consult the Competition Authority, the Minister may appoint a competition 
advisor other than the Competition Authority to assist in arriving at a view 
about SLC. 
 
It is readily acknowledged that maintaining the stability of the financial 
system is vital for the functioning of markets. In an emergency, mergers may 
have to be approved rapidly. However, other jurisdictions have combined 
the flexibility of quick approval but still allowed a key role for the national 
competition authority in analysing the competitive effects of the merger. 
 
The United Kingdom has one such system. Although the Secretary of 
State makes the final decision as does the Minister for Finance in Ireland, 
nevertheless the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) provides an analysis of the 
competition effects of the proposed merger. This has occurred with the 
anticipated takeover of Lloyds TSB plc of HBOS plc in which the OFT had 
from September 25 to October 24, 2008 to make a report to the Secretary of 
State.47  
 
The Competition Authority could have been given a bigger role, 
especially as the Competition Authority’s merger control function generally 
gets good marks in surveys.48 There is ample evidence that competition 
problems are likely to arise in any merger situation involving banking in 
Ireland. In 2003, for example, the two leading banks accounted for between 
65-75 per cent of the value of personal current accounts. Although there has 
been some entry since then, the market share of these two banks is unlikely 
to have declined significantly. As the Competition Authority has conducted 
an extensive analysis of the banking sector, it has expertise in the area.49  
CONCLUSIONS 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this discussion of recent examples of 
bespoke protection. First, the public choice model of awarding bespoke 
protection is unlikely to deliver outcomes consistent with welfare economics 
unless new or revised rules and/or policies are introduced, a subject dealt 
with in Section 5 below. While from a welfare economics viewpoint there 
are no grounds for either exempting voice-over actors from the Competition 
Act or imposing a moratorium on the issuance of new taxi licences, the 
public choice model would predict that both are candidates for bespoke 
 
46 More details may be found at the Department of Finance website, 
http://www.finance.gov.ie/.  
47 More details may be found on the Office of Fair Trading’s website at: 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice_and_resources/resource_base/Mergers_home/comment/.  
48 Based on a survey of stakeholders undertaken independently in preparation for the three-
year strategy of the Competition Authority, covering 2009-2011. 
49 Competition Authority (2005). 
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protection. Second, promoting competition as a policy objective – judged by 
government policy – has been accorded less weight since the onset of the 
recession.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
4. 
The Costs 
and Benefits 
of Restrictive 
Regulatory 
and 
Competition 
Policy 
Just because these regulatory and competition interventions are off budget 
and relatively costless to implement in budgetary terms does not necessarily 
mean that such intervention is not costless. Indeed, the precise opposite is 
the case. Arguably restrictive regulation and competition costs are higher 
than budgetary measures designed to achieve the same objective. The latter 
are more transparent, easier to understand and quantify and thus more 
difficult to hide from the public. They are thus more likely to be subject to 
critical scrutiny. Furthermore, in recessionary times budgetary expenditure is 
less likely to be used to supply bespoke protection through, for example, 
subsidies. In this section the costs of bespoke protection are presented, 
together with the benefits.   
THE COSTS 
There are a number of costs associated with the granting of bespoke 
protection. These can be divided into four main categories:  
 
• Lower consumer welfare as a result of higher prices and reduced 
quality of service;  
 
• Misallocation of resources due to dissipation of resources in rent 
seeking behaviour and X-inefficiency; 
 
• A less flexible economy that will underperform when the world 
economy recovers ; and, 
 
• Dynamic losses that increase over time. 
 
In each case the nature of the cost will be specified and evidence of the 
costs will be presented. In general the evidence refers to Ireland. However, 
the adverse impact of bespoke protection on the ability of Ireland to take 
advantage of the recovery in the world economy is based on evidence drawn 
from the US for the 1930s and Japan for the 1990s. 
Lower Consumer Welfare: Higher Prices and Reduced Quality of Service  
Bespoke protection of the sort discussed above reduces the scope for 
market forces to allocate resources. Typically in well functioning markets if 
prices are raised then entry takes place and/or existing firms expand output, 
thus moderating any price increase. However, with bespoke protection there 
is much less opportunity for these mechanisms to operate. Entry, for 
example, may be prohibited. The market becomes less competitive; prices 
are higher then they otherwise would be and the quality of service may 
decline. Consumers are worst off and the beneficiaries of bespoke 
protection are – initially at least – better off, an issue that will be discussed 
further below. 
 
In many instances the future stream of benefits from bespoke protection 
are capitalised in the value of the right to engage in the economic activity 
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that has been restricted. In the case of taxis, for example, it is the taxi 
licence, in the case of a pub it is also the licence. Table 2 presents estimates 
of the value of these licences for specific years expressed in 1999/2000 €. In 
some cases, as noted in the ‘Comments’ column, the bespoke protection has 
subsequently been abolished, an issue discussed further below. These licence 
values suggest a non-trivial transfer of resources from a dispersed group – 
consumers – to the concentrated group receiving the protection. In the case 
of taxis the evidence suggests that these licence values are high by 
international standards (Barret, 2006, p. 5).  
Table 2: Impact of Restrictive Entry Regulation, Licence Value, Selected 
Activities, Various Years, Ireland 
    
Regulated 
Activity 
Year Licence 
Value 
Estimated 
Value of 
Licence 
(€1999/2000) 
Comment 
Pharmacy 2002 Increased value 
of pharmacy by 
circa 40% 
The restrictive regulations were 
revoked by the Minister due to a 
case brought in the High Court. 
Pubs 2000 140,000 Geographical mobility of licence, 
2000  
Road freight 1980 40,000 Dail deregulated, 1986 
Taxis 1999 101,000 High Court abolished controls, 
2000 
    
Source: OECD (2001, pps. 31, 32, 36) and Purcell (2004, pp. 51-52). 
 
There is less evidence available on the impact of restrictive regulation on 
prices in Ireland, but the impact of restrictive regulation on airline routes 
was to raise prices by 18-33 per cent.50 Weakening competition policy by 
exemptions and various administrative measures means that anti-competitive 
activity, such as cartels, is less likely to be investigated and prosecuted. A 
large worldwide survey of the impact of cartels on prices concluded that the 
median impact of a cartel was to raise prices by 25 per cent (Werden, 2008, 
p. 10). 
 
With competitive pressure being less onerous the quality of service may 
decline. As noted above, waiting times for taxis decreased once entry 
controls were abolished. Similarly, with the liberalisation of entry into the 
airlines the number of destinations served from Dublin increased 
dramatically and consumers were given a choice of types of service – full 
service compared to no frills. Although referring to the UK, evidence 
suggested that where there was more competition among pharmacists 
service quality improved. For example, …when a pharmacy faced no other 
pharmacy within 5km, it was less likely to offer home delivery… (OFT, 2003, p. 44).  
 
In some cases entry control is geographical thus leading to under-served 
populations. For example, the people of Knock, Co. Mayo were denied a 
pharmacy – until the relevant regulations were revoked by the Minister in 
2002 due to a case brought in the High Court  – despite the fact that Knock 
had 1.5 million tourists and pilgrims a year because the local health board 
determined that there was not a market for such a facility despite two 
 
50 Real decline in Dublin-London price 1985-1995 was 25 per cent; US airline deregulation 
15 per cent price decline. In 1985 the Irish government announced that it had decided to 
deregulate air transport. For details see OECD (2001, p. 33).  
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applications to set up a pharmacy in Knock (Competition Authority, 2001b, 
pp. 12-13). A similar situation existed with respect to pubs where Dublin 
was considerably ‘under-pubbed.’ (Competition Authority, 1998, pp. 36-50). 
Rent Seeking: Rectangles and Triangles 
It could, of course, be argued that the above discussion has overestimated 
the costs of bespoke regulation, since what is being measured is the 
rectangle L in Figure 1 which represents a transfer from dispersed groups 
such as consumers to concentrated groups such as producers. Economists 
should be neutral on distributional issues. Instead attention should be 
confined to the deadweight loss of consumer welfare, represented by the 
triangle D. This is the so-called Harberger (1954) triangle, named after the 
economist that was among the first to estimate its magnitude due to 
monopoly, concluding that it was quite small, slightly more than 0.01 per 
cent of national income. However, this argument does not stand up to 
critical scrutiny.  
Figure 1: Bespoke Protection, Prices and Output 
 
€ M = Price + entry controls
C = Competitive solution 
D = Deadweight loss 
L = Transfer to producers 
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Source: See text. 
 
First, the redistribution of income has not been achieved in an open and 
transparent manner, compared to a tax increase. Considerable concern has 
been expressed about so-called stealth taxes; bespoke protection is only one 
remove from such stealth taxes.51 Second, rent seeking behaviour in the form 
of lobbying for bespoke protection consumes resources. Such activities are 
concerned with wealth redistribution rather than wealth creation. Not all 
requests for protection can be granted. In the political marketplace it is 
difficult to set out criteria for accepting the demands of group A as opposed 
 
51 For example, restrictions on entry into taxi services not only redistributes income from 
consumers to producers, but also prevents the unemployed, for example, from supplying 
such services. 
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to group B. Firms and other organised groups will thus lobby for protection. 
Equally, in some cases, those who oppose bespoke protection will also 
organise and lobby. The use of resources for these purposes is considered 
unproductive and therefore a waste. Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974), and 
Posner (1975) have argued that resources devoted to demanding bespoke 
protection will be equal to the rectangle L. Third, once bespoke protection is 
awarded then the group that is in receipt of such protection may have to 
devote resources to retaining that protection as entrants may wish to share 
in the rents that are being generated. Fourth, the rents represented by L in 
Figure 1 may be dissipated by those in receipt of these rents in a variety of 
ways. Production may become less efficient as competitive pressure eases; 
X-inefficiency will become important. As a result cost curves will tend to 
drift upwards, with the result that the observed L and D based on actual cost 
data will understate the magnitude of both L and D. In sum, some or all of 
the rectangle L as well as the triangle D should be considered as the cost of 
supplying bespoke protection.  
Thwarting the Road to Recovery 
A recent ESRI recovery scenario for Ireland from the current recession 
envisages the possibility of a rapid recovery once the world economy starts 
to pick up (Bergin, 2009, Figure 2, p. 11). A critical implicit assumption is 
that resources will be able to flow from activities where demand is unlikely 
to expand such as construction to those where demand is likely to be more 
buoyant such as electronics and financial services. This in turn implies that 
there will be no artificial barriers that impede the flow of resources between 
markets. However, bespoke protection, by raising returns in the protected 
sector is likely to not only impede the flow resources but also slow 
adjustment and adaptation. 
 
A number of recent papers have examined the impact of granting 
bespoke protection to markets in economies suffering a recession. In the US 
under Roosevelt’s New Deal policies certain sectors were made exempt 
from antitrust laws and cartels were allowed to be formed provided that 
wages were raised. Cole and Ohanian (2004) in a careful study of the effects 
of these policies conclude that New Deal cartelization policies are an important 
factor in accounting for the failure of the economy to recover back to trend (p. 779). 
Equally, in Japan certain sectors were shielded from competition using a 
variety of instruments including …weak antitrust enforcement, legalized cartels, 
subsidies, protection and cooperative R&D (Porter et al., 2000, p. 117). The 
evidence suggests that these sectors did not fare well in, for example, export 
markets. As a result Porter and Sakakibara (2004, p. 47) conclude that unless 
the …serious impediments and distortions… that developed in the 1990s are 
addressed then …the period of Japanese economic stagnation will be unnecessarily 
protracted. 
Dynamic Losses: Bespoke Protection is Not Just for Christmas 
The discussion above is largely in terms of static welfare losses. However, as 
the discussion of how bespoke protection can thwart the recovery from the 
current recession makes clear, there are ongoing losses which may increase 
over time. Hence, the dynamic effects of bespoke protection also need to be 
considered.  
 
Dynamic effects can be divided into two broad groups. First, dynamic 
competition usually refers to innovation through new products and 
processes. Entrants are often the source of such competition, as they apply a 
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technology from another market or a person leaves an existing firm to 
establish a new firm. Bespoke protection frequently restricts entry which 
removes this source of competition. Furthermore, this leads to less 
competitive pressure on incumbents who as a result are less likely to 
innovate. Thus bespoke regulation is likely to harm dynamic competition. As 
such it is inconsistent with the recently announced government policy of the 
promotion of the smart economy, which is based on innovation 
(Department of the Taoiseach, 2008).  
 
Second, dynamic effects occur through the impact of the bespoke 
protection increasing as the constraints become more binding. The number 
of licences might be fixed or expand at a rate well below the increase in 
demand. The result is that each licence holder will experience an increase in 
demand. Since entry is restricted price is likely to increase and the value of 
the licence increase. This is clearly observable in the case of taxis where the 
licence value increased by almost 26 (in nominal terms) and almost 10 (in 
real terms) fold between 1980, two years after the introduction of bespoke 
protection to 2000, when it was terminated due to a High Court judgment. 
(See Table 3 for details). 
Table 3: Taxi Licence Value, Dublin, Selected Years, 1980-2000 
   
Year Value (€) 
Nominal 
Value (€) 
Real* 
   
1980 4,400 4,400 
1985 9,100 5,100 
1990 54,600 26,000 
1995 89,000 37,400 
2000 114,000 42,300 
   
* Deflated using CPI. 
Source: Barrett (2006, Table 3, p. 6). 
 
Dynamic costs associated with bespoke regulation will, other things being 
equal, increase with time. In this respect there are good grounds for arguing 
that once granted bespoke protection is difficult to reverse. Indeed, there is 
an inbuilt mechanism to ensure that the regulation becomes more restrictive 
and binding. The beneficiaries of bespoke protection will defend their turf 
and their lifestyle. They will adjust to their newfound wealth. In this context 
it is important to distinguish between the initial and subsequent beneficiaries 
of bespoke protection. While the initial beneficiary of bespoke regulation 
earns a rent represented by the capitalised value of the future returns in the 
licence, the new owner will only earn a normal rate of return and will have 
an incentive to realise unanticipated further gains. On the other hand, if the 
bespoke protection is withdrawn then the firms subject to the protection will 
experience large losses and hence are likely to vigorously resist change and 
reform.52 Tullock (1975) has referred to this as the transitional gains trap. 
Thus bespoke regulation is likely to be long lived, not temporary. 
 
The evidence presented in Table 4 is broadly consistent with this view, 
with protection lasting almost a century in the case of pubs. However, it is 
 
52 Of course, expectations about the stability of the regulatory regime will be incorporated 
into the price of a licence. If liberalisation is anticipated then a high discount rate will be 
used to evaluate future benefits. However, if no liberalisation is anticipated a lower discount 
rate will be used.   
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also true that in some cases that the bespoke protection was much shorter – 
six years in the case of pharmacies. In this case it was revoked by the 
Minister due to a case brought in the High Court. Efforts were made by 
both the government and the pharmacists’ representative body to find a way 
of reintroducing the restrictive entry regulation but to no avail (Purcell, 
2004, pp. 48-49). 
Table 4: Restrictive Entry Regulation, Duration, Selected Activities, Ireland 
     
Regulated 
Activity 
Start Reformed/ 
Abolished 
 
Duration Comment 
Airlines 1932 1986 54 yrs Abolished. Administrative 
act 
Bus – Dublin 1932 No Reform 77 yrs + Very restrictive licensing 
regime 
Bus – Inter 
City 
1932 No Reform 77 yrs + Restrictive licensing regime 
Cement 1933 2000 67 yrs 1 licence issued 
Supermarkets 2001 No reform 8 yrs + Restriction on store size of 
supermarkets, with a lower 
cap for discounters such as 
Aldi & Lidl 
Pharmacies 1996 2002 6 yrs Revoked by the Minister 
due to a case brought  in 
the High Court 
Pubs 1902 Partial 
reform, 2000 
98 yrs+ Partial reform; geographical 
mobility of licence between 
country and Dublin 
Road freight 1932  1986 54 yrs Dail deregulated 
Taxis 1978 2000 22 yrs High Court abolished entry 
controls 
     
Source: Barrett (2006); Competition Authority (1998, 2001a, 2008); Massey (2007); OECD 
(2001, pps. 31, 32, 33, 36).  
CONCLUSION 
None of the four sets of costs is likely to be readily apparent to the victims – 
consumers. The costs in terms of lower productivity are in the future and 
may take sometime to emerge. Linking bespoke protection to slowing the 
recovery from the current recession may be a difficult stretch for people to 
accept.  Quantification of the impact of bespoke protection requires careful 
measurement and quantification. This can take considerable time and effort, 
thus delaying the necessary debate as to the appropriateness of bespoke 
protection. Nevertheless, in some cases consumers can make the connection 
between bespoke protection and low quality service, such as the long waiting 
times for a taxi because of restriction on numbers. 
BENEFITS 
The benefits and beneficiaries of bespoke protection appear, at first glance, a 
mirror image of the costs outlined above. The concentrated group, whether 
it is taxi drivers or pharmacists, receive rents, while the politicians receive 
support, in return for supplying bespoke protection, in various forms. 
However, this is somewhat misleading as has already been alluded to earlier 
in the paper. While it is the case that the firms engaged in the activity 
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granted bespoke protection are in receipt of rents when the protection is 
first introduced, when the right is subsequently sold then some or all of the 
stream of future rents are capitalised in the value of the licence and 
subsequent participants are likely to earn a normal rate of return – with little 
or zero rent.  
THE BANK GUARANTEE: A COUNTER-EXAMPLE? 
It could be argued that one of the largest recent examples of bespoke 
protection, the two year bank guarantee provided in September 2008, 
referred to in Section 3 above, is an exception to the picture presented in 
this and earlier sections, that bespoke protection has little if any merit. It is 
not clear whether such protection was actively sought by bankers. 
Intervention to protect the banking system from collapsing is likely to be 
welfare enhancing, given the undoubted negative externalities in terms of the 
seizing up of credit markets and loss of faith in this vital sector of the 
economy. Hence, supplying bespoke protection in the form of the guarantee 
would, it could be argued, improve welfare and cure a market failure. 
However, is such a conclusion warranted?  
 
There is an alternative version of events that is consistent with the view 
that the guarantee is an example of bespoke protection that is needlessly 
costly to consumers and taxpayers. It appears that the guarantee was 
supplied in response to the difficulties of one bank – supposedly Anglo-Irish 
– that was …unable to roll-over its foreign borrowings and had effectively run out of 
collateral to refinance at the European Central Bank (Honohan, 2009, p. 220). 
Other banks did not face a comparable situation. Hence an alternative 
course of action to the guarantee, given the insolvency of one bank,  would 
have been to nationalise it and effect an orderly wind down, while at the 
same time introducing measures to provide more limited assistance to other 
banks should there be a risk of contagion.53 Such measures might have 
included …specific state guarantees for new borrowings or injections of preference shares 
(Honohan, 2009, p. 220). Such intervention would not have provided 
protection to the shareholders of the bank at risk – unless the government 
overpaid – while the assistance to the other banks would have been limited 
and appropriately priced. This, of course, did not happen. Hence the fact 
that the protection provided through the bank guarantee was far more than 
necessary, suggests that the awarding of the guarantee is indeed an example 
of bespoke protection consistent with the thrust of the paper.54 
 
It should be remembered, however, that the events surrounding the 
introduction of the bank guarantee and the information available is not all in 
the public domain so that any conclusion must, of necessity, be tentative. 
CONCLUSION 
Bespoke protection inflicts large enduring costs on both consumers and the 
wider economy, while the benefits are ephemeral. As such bespoke 
protection should be avoided. 
 
 
 
53 See Honohan (2009) and Fitz Gerald (2008). The latter suggests that this was the position 
of the Department of Finance. 
54 Honohan (2009) and Fitz Gerald (2008) list some of the negative economic consequences 
of the guarantee.  
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5.  
Towards a 
Solution 
INTRODUCTION 
In this section of the paper the threads of the discussion are brought 
together and the policy implications developed. The three questions raised in 
Section 1 are answered with respect to the demand and supply of bespoke 
protection. Next, attention turns to policies that should enhance welfare in 
deciding whether or not to grant bespoke protection. These policies include: 
the provision of better information; a regulatory budget; and, screens that 
should be applied before granting such protection. 
TWO MODELS AND THREE QUESTIONS 
Section 1 of the paper posed three questions with respect to bespoke 
protection: ‘Why?’; ‘Which Instrument?’; and, ‘What are the Consequences?’ 
These questions were answered within a public choice and welfare 
economics framework in Section 2, with the results summarised in Table 1. 
Sections 3 and 4 of the paper examined the record of bespoke protection in 
Ireland, enabling Table 1 to be amended to take into account the 
consequences of bespoke protection, with the results presented in Table 5. 
The burden of the paper is that the welfare economics model compared to 
the public choice model is based on a different rationale for supplying 
bespoke protection, favours using different instruments to provide the 
protection and has quite different consequences. The public choice model 
damages consumer welfare; the welfare economics model enhances 
consumer welfare. 
Table 5: Public Choice and Welfare Economics Models: Answers to Three 
Questions: A Reprise  
  
Public Choice Model Welfare Economics Model 
 
Q1 Why? Political benefits> political 
costs 
 
Q2 Which instrument? 
Regulation/competition; not budgetary 
 
Q3 Consequences? 
Stalled recovery, lower consumer 
welfare, ephemeral benefits 
 
 
Q1 Why? Market failure 
 
 
Q2 Which instrument? Preference for 
more transparency 
 
Q3 Consequences? 
No slowdown in recovery, no long term 
consumer harm 
 
Source: See text. 
 
This naturally leads to the policy question of can policies or mechanisms 
be developed that will move policy outcomes closer to the welfare 
economics model than the public choice model. It may be objected that this 
is not feasible; that politicians would not agree to such a change. However, 
this is incorrect. Politicians often make commitments or tie their hands so as 
to limit their discretion in such a way that welfare is enhanced. For example, 
Ireland and other countries through GATT and then the WTO have 
committed through successive international rounds of cutting tariffs and 
reducing non-tariff barriers where the major beneficiaries are consumers and 
narrow concentrated groups often are the losers.55 A similar argument could 
be made with respect to Ireland’s membership of the European Union, 
where the state aid rules have, for example, limited the ability of the Irish 
 
55 This is not to deny that concentrated groups of exporters gain from such free trade 
agreements. 
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government to provide financial assistance to Aer Lingus after 9/11 as well 
as to Waterford Crystal. Finally, many countries have assigned control of 
monetary policy to an independent central bank such as the Bank of 
England or the European Central Bank.  
REDUCING INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES: THE EMPEROR 
HAS NO CLOTHES 
As noted in Section 2 it is much easier to supply bespoke protection where 
there is information asymmetry. In other words, the concentrated group is 
well aware of the impact of the bespoke protection, but the dispersed group, 
usually consumers, is unaware of the cost and may even be under the 
mistaken impression that the bespoke regulation improves their welfare. 
Furthermore, for reasons set out above it is rational for the members of a 
dispersed group not to invest in determining the impact of the bespoke 
regulation on their welfare – they remain rationally ignorant. 
 
One solution is thus to remove the information asymmetry by supplying 
an evaluation of the impact of a proposed bespoke protection so that 
members of dispersed groups are in a position to evaluate the impact of the 
protection. One of the case studies discussed in Section 3 above concerned 
whether or not there should be a moratorium on the issuance of new taxi 
licences. In this case the Taxi Regulator commissioned and issued a report 
that addressed the question of a moratorium on issuing new taxi licences, 
firmly rejecting the idea. The availability of such information makes it more 
difficult for concentrated groups to argue successfully in favour of bespoke 
protection since there is more likely to be a perception that such protection 
is likely to have an adverse effect on consumer welfare. 
 
Nevertheless, the provision of additional information is only the first 
step. As noted above concentrated groups can overcome the free rider 
problem, whereas dispersed groups find it harder if not impossible to 
overcome this problem. Thus, some thought needs to be given to how the 
voice of the dispersed groups can be articulated and thus command 
attention in the policymaking process. There are already a number of 
agencies that fulfil this role at the moment. Such bodies are also responsible 
for the generation of information to make dispersed groups aware of the 
issues. 
 
The Competition Authority has a specific role under the Competition Act 
to comment on the …implications for competition in the market for goods and services 
of proposals for legislation (including any instruments to be made under any enactment). It 
has taken this role with respect to, for example, taxis. Similarly, the National 
Consumer Agency has also made representations concerning bespoke 
protection in the taxi market. Individual regulatory agencies, to the extent 
that they are mandated to promote consumer welfare, may also play a similar 
role, albeit confined to a single sector. The role of the Taxi Regulator and 
the CER has already been alluded to in this respect. The regulatory impact 
analysis procedure discussed below is another mechanism with respect to 
new regulatory legislation. Finally, the Department of Finance might play a 
stronger role.56 It is concerned with the overall efficiency and growth of the 
economy and research cited above shows how damaging bespoke protection 
can be to the economy and it would seem that this Department would have 
 
56 See, for example, Cowen (2007). 
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a major interest in promoting mechanisms and policies that limit such 
protection. Without such effective mechanisms and policies ongoing 
structural change will be more difficult to achieve. 
REGULATORY BUDGET: A TAX IS A TAX IS A TAX ……… 
Bespoke protection is essentially taxation by regulation and relaxing 
competition policy. By supplying such protection the concentrated group is 
able to impose a small per unit quasi tax on purchasers of the group’s good 
or service. However, as discussed above the cost is more than just the initial 
price hike; there is also likely to be a reduction in quality, while, over time, 
dynamic costs such as lower levels of innovation, will occur. Since all of 
these quasi tax increases are off-budget the result is that there is likely to be 
little if any discussion concerning the burdens imposed by the bespoke 
protection. 
 
One option to redress this imbalance is the introduction of a regulatory 
budget.57 Such a budget would quantify the quasi taxes imposed by any 
bespoke protection that is being proposed. Furthermore, the revenue 
generated by these quasi taxes would be allocated to the relevant 
government department; the Department of Transport in the case of a cap 
on taxis; the Department of Communications, Energy and Natural 
Resources for the increased regulatory risk because of the Minister’s 
intervention in the determination of electricity prices.  
 
It is, of course, recognised that estimation of the quasi tax imposed by 
bespoke protection will not always be easy. There can be genuine differences 
about the magnitude of the quasi tax. There may be considerable 
administrative costs in the provision of the budget in terms of collecting the 
necessary information. It is perhaps for reasons such as these that although 
the idea of a regulatory budget has been discussed for around 30 years, it is 
only recently been introduced in the UK: a trial run in 2009 before full 
implementation in 2010. 
 
However, to a considerable degree, while discussions over the practicality 
of a regulatory budget are of obvious importance, such objections miss the 
point of introducing a regulatory budget. The purpose is not to present 
precise estimates and generate large volumes of consultants’ reports. Rather 
the purpose is to get policymakers to realise that bespoke protection 
imposes costs which should be explicitly taken into account in any decision 
making process.58 
 
 
 
 
 
57 For a discussion of the concept of a regulatory budget see, for example, DeMuth (1980), 
Doern (2009) and Thompson (1998). Doern reviews the developments in the UK referred 
to below in the text. 
58 It could be argued that tax expenditures are similar to bespoke protection in that they are 
less than transparent. In this respect it should be noted that the Department of Finance 
does publish estimates of such tax breaks and has undertaken a major review of said tax 
breaks. (For details see the Department of Finance’s website: 
http://www.finance.gov.ie/ViewDoc.asp?fn=/home.asp). There seems no reason in 
principle this could not be extended to bespoke protection. 
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EXEMPTIONS AND REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
An important part of policymaking is necessarily evaluation. Policies should 
be adopted where the benefits outweigh the costs and thus society as a 
whole is better off. To inform such decisions analysis and study are required. 
However, this can be a time consuming exercise and as a result screening 
devices are introduced so that only the most important instances of 
government intervention are analysed. For example, policy interventions that 
are likely to impose costs above a certain minimum threshold or the 
likelihood that significant competition problems will occur would be subject 
to extensive analysis. These issues are considered first with respect to 
exemptions from competition law and then the introduction of restrictive 
regulation. 
Exemptions from the Competition Act 
The Competition Act is a law of general application that covers all sectors of 
the economy. It does not prohibit all forms of cooperation between 
businesses. An agreement that does not have as its object or effect the 
restriction of competition is not an offence under the Competition Act; 
equally a merger that does not substantially lessen competition would not be 
prohibited.  The Competition Act only applies to undertakings – persons or 
organisations – involved in the sale of goods or the supply of services for 
gain. Hence, certain thresholds need to be met before the Competition Act 
comes into play. Even when the Competition Act is breached, in the first 
instance, there are mechanisms within the Competition Act that may mean 
an otherwise anti-competitive conduct is still permitted. A dominant firm 
that is apparently abusing its dominant position may have an objective 
justification; an anti-competitive agreement that apparently raises prices may 
improve economic progress, reduce costs and benefit consumers; and, a 
merger that apparently leads to SLC may be permitted if it leads to 
efficiencies that result in lower overall prices to consumers.  Thus 
competition law contains within it a system of checks and balances designed 
to improve consumer welfare even for otherwise anti-competitive conduct. 
Thus if government is going to exempt the activity of a certain group from 
the Competition Act, it should first determine whether or not it can satisfy 
the relevant conditions as set out above. If it does not – as appears to be the 
case in voice-over actors, discussed above – then the government should be 
required to provide compelling public interest reasons for such a policy 
move. In the case of voice-over actors this has not been forthcoming, 
setting an unsettling precedent. 
Screens and Full Regulatory Impact Analysis 
Ireland has recently developed a system of reviewing proposals for 
regulation.59 It is a two-part regulatory impact analysis (“RIA”) procedure: 
first, a Screening RIA for selecting those regulations that should be subject 
to further analysis;60 and second, a Full RIA, an evaluation of the proposed 
regulation that may lead to a full cost-benefit framework. This is clearly a 
 
60 On screening filters see, for example, Lyons (2005/6); and Lyons and O’Toole (2006). A 
Screening RIA results in significant regulations being selected for a Full RIA. Significant 
means initial costs of at least €10 million or cumulative costs over 10 years of at least €50 
million. For further details see Department of the Taoiseach (n.d.). 
59 For details of the programme see the better regulation website at: 
http://www.betterregulation.ie/eng/. Accessed 17 June 2009. 
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move in the right direction. In order to ensure that a healthy debate occurs it 
is important that RIAs are published which is the intention of government. 
RIA is clearly a promising development in ensuring that the costs and 
benefits of bespoke protection are taken into account in decision making. 
However, it is too early to come to a judgment as to its effectiveness.  
 
It may seem a bit odd, perhaps even out of place, to present a paper on 
the supply and demand for bespoke protection at a conference on budgetary 
perspectives. However, that would be too narrow a perspective. A little like 
the drunk who, on losing his keys at night, only looks under the street lamp 
where the light shines. The rigor and transparency of the budget process 
leads to a substitution effect as organised groups use alternative instruments 
to achieve effects comparable to a tax increase. It is, therefore, important to 
examine these effects and to the extent possible ensure that the use of these 
alternative instruments is subject to the same rigor and transparency as taxes 
are subject to through the budgetary process. 
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